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I am switching to my new, better blog. Check it out:

DESIDERATA

http://hensley.reformedphilosophy.org

My old posts will be on the new site, plus lots more content and prettier pages.

What Now?

If I am correct in my assessment from my previous post, then what follows?

I would think that we need a reformation more thorough than even the Protestant Reformation; that one was never complted, and much of what was gained has now been lost.

We need a reformation in our theology, philosophy, and practical theology/ecclesiology.

Let's be the Christian Marxists, but without the marxism!

Can Two Walk Together

Can two walk together, unless they are agreed? Agreed on what?

It is nothing new that people are questioning the evangelical movement; there have been an assortment of books and articles questioning the boundaries of the evangelical movement, and now there is at least one Southern Baptist seminary professor who refuses to be called an evangelical. For those of you who know about RPG (formerly RPS; formerly, formerly RATS), one of our main goals is to critique the evangelical movement in order to show its unbiblical foundation and ineffectual impact on the culture. (Our other main goal is tightly related to this; namely, to promote the philosophical system known as Scripturalism, which is really just the solution to the problems of evangelicalism).

While many people recognize that evangelicalism faces many problems, the movement against the evangelical movement is actually fractured and divided. There are so many varied levels of dissatisfaction amongst those who have a complaint against evangelicalism. For instance, one of the divides within the camp is between traditional evangelicals and postconservatives. This was brought to the forefront a few years ago when Roger Nicole pushed to have Open Theists Clark Pinnock and John Sanders removed from the Evangelical Theological Society. Many traditionalists believed that this particular strand of postconservatism was, to borrow a phrase from John Piper, beyond the bounds of evangelicalism.

In his reply to Nicole's charges, Pinnock reminded all that this was not merely a fight over Open Theism. That is, some of Nicole's supporters (e.g., Wayne Grudem) did not merely want to remove Open Theists from ETS, but egalitarians as well. The problem was that Nicole is an egalitarian; Pinnock's question is, "Where does this stop?" One may push further: Wayne Grudem is a charismatic, and there are many who believe that this violates Sola Scriptura. Many of these would claim that one cannot be an evangelical and reject Sola Scriptura. Shall the society kick Grudem out after Nicole and Pinnock? (Obviously there is a difference between ETS and the evangelical movement as a whole, but one might suppose that ETS is a microcosm of the movement as a whole).

Other postconservative issues that are dividing evangelicalism are narrative theology, inclusivism versus exclusivism, the doctrine of hell, the doctrine of scripture, and etc. As I argued just above, the dividing lines are not necessarily split between traditionalists and postconservatives. There is also the phenomena known as the emergent church. There seems to be no centralized set of doctrine associated with this movement (in fact, many within the movement refuse to call it a movement). Some are more emergent than others; some appear to reject any traditional notion of epistemology and systematic theology. Others seem to embrace some traditional notions of philosophy and theology while embracing certain emergent fads. The emergent church is not exclusively a problem for the evangelical movement; that is, they think the evangelical movement is too narrow. It doesn't appear that they want to reject the traditions in toto, but want to embrace other traditions (such as the Romish and Eastern Orthodox traditions) along with some traditional evangelical traditions.

This seems to reduce down to the following: some claim that evangelicalism has been the victim of modernism and Enlightenment philosophical categories; anything that believes in absolute truth that can be known seems to be labeled modernism (this is, of course, forgetting that this concept was around well before "modernism"). Others think that evangelicalism has bowed down at the alter of postmodernism; though I am not convinced most people know exactly what postmodernism is--I certainly don't have a clear concept of it, and I think that's because there is no clear concept of it. Anything that smacks of relativism is labeled postmodernism (though, again, this concept was around well before postmodernism).

Still others claim that evangelicalism has bowed down to pagan philosophies, but it has nothing to do with the notion of relativism versus confidence in one's epistemology (i.e., what many called modernism). I would say that evangelicalism has not consistently held to Sola Scriptura; we have followed the way of Aristotle and forgetting that "eye has not seen nor has ear heard." We have rejected the unique Christian axiom of "The Bible alone is the Word of God." We have whored ourselves over to "science" (which, itself, is the paragon of pseudo-science); we think our attempts at archeology or biology is more authoritative than God's Word. But God could find no one greater to swear by, so He swore by Himself. What a pity for God that He did not realize that He could have sworn by modern science. We have adopted the pagan presuppositions and theories of science thinking that we can use them for our own purposes; but what fellowship does light have with darkness? Too many Christians do not understand that to take realist approach to modern scientific theories is to explicitly reject essentials of our faith.

Evangelicalism has also embraced irrationality in the name of "mystery". We fail to realize that a mystery in the Bible is not something that is ineffable or incomprehensible; it is something that is perfectly intelligible but something that God has not revealed. Our notion of saving faith is led askew because men like Professor Strange at Mid-America Reformed Seminary state that the sine qua non of faith is ineffable and unintelligible. The church rejects Christianity as a God-given intellectualism (see, knowledge puffs up, but love builds up); they embrace Kierkegaard, Schleiermacher, or Barth (though, of course, not knowing who any of these men are) and speak of some nebulous "personal relationship" with Jesus. While I might do another post on what the Bible says this "personal relationship" with Jesus is, I am left with the distinct impression that the church does not know what it means; after all, the sine qua non of faith is inherently irrational. I've heard a pastor in a conservative PCA church say from the pulpit: "Christianity is not rational. You cannot be completely logical and still be a Christian." I've heard a pastor from a conservative SBC church say while teaching: "God is totally Other. There are no words we can use that accurately describe Him."

Of course, there are the groups who embrace this irrationalism has a sign of piety; "We don't want your elitism!" While very few groups completely reject any intellectual aspect of Christianity, it is deprecated to the point where one must chant the neo-orthodox mantra: "Faith must curb logic." The Auburn Avenue heretics admit in their book, The Federal Vision, that their doctrine is inconsistent with itself; the only solution is to abandon logic. Logic can only take you so far; you must then take a leap of faith. Well, let the lemmings leap off the cliff; perhaps, in time, it will, to use a Darwinian metaphor, filter the evangelical gene pool.

There are other flash points as well: churches abandon sound doctrine and confidence in the sovereign grace of a sovereign God. They adopt church growth strategies and preach psycho-babble instead of the Word of God. We forget that the Scriptures plainly teach that we are not to stray to the right side or the left side of what God has commanded. Youth groups, Sunday School, and women's bible study groups are adopted en masse because they seem "to work". While pragmatism might be an acceptable philosophical commitment in the realm of opinion, our worship to God is not a matter of opinion. However, there are those (e.g., John Piper) who reject the regulative principle and say that anything we can do to magnify Jesus and draw people to Him is acceptable. With high-sounding drivel like that, who could disagree? Well, I can. One could also mention the Romish hold-over of a professional clergy and other such infelicities, but I must draw the line somewhere.

The point is this: evangelicalism is hopelessly fractured. It is not that the movement is fractured like a two-dimensional pie chart where all of these controversies are represented by a slice of the pie. It is much more chaotic. Two men may agree that Open Theism is bad, but disagree on the topic of gender roles. Two other men may agree that the church's committment to pragmatism is bad, but disagree about whether rationality is good or bad. There are so many layers to this problem. And we are brought back to the verse I quoted at the beginning: Can two walk together, unless they are agreed? Agreed on what?

I am suggesting that it is inherent to the evangelical experiment that we all agree on the least common theological demoninator. For instance, ETS started out with only a requirement of a belief in the inerrancy of the Scriptures (only later was a clause about the Trinity added). Some leaders like Al Mohler speak of primary, secondary and even tertiary truths in the Scriptures. Primary truths are essential; secondary may cause some major discussions; tertiary aren't really that important at all. But how does one determine this hierarchy of truth? Can one even justify this hierarchy? Did Paul consider himself clean of the blood of all men because he preached the primary and some secondary truths? Or did he consider himself clean of the blood of all men because he preached the whole counsel of the Word of God? It is, without a doubt, the latter.

Is it any wonder that the church finds itself impotent to combat heresy within the church, to oppose evils without the church, and to maintain its identity? We have taken the God-given wisdom of the Scriptures (which, Paul tells us, are the very thoughts of Christ) and castrated it so that it is but a shell of its former glory. It seems that one doesn't even have to believe in justification by faith alone for evangelical leaders to consider him deeply Christian (see my post about Al Mohler). The Scriptures nowhere speak of being sanctified by primary (as opposed to secondary and tertiary) truths or being united around primary (as opposed to secondary and tertiary) truths. This is not to say that all who disagree with us are unbelievers, but what they are promoting is less than Christianity. We say that evangelicalism has failed because it must fail. It is theological schizophrenia; it cannot radically oppose the anti-Christian culture because it takes out most of the vaccine from the vial. Can two walk together, unless they are agreed? No, they cannot; and this is why the evangelical experiment will fail.

I Swear I'm Not Related

I have found something at Purgatorio that has made me

very sad about my lineage. As you know, my last name is Hensley, and before today I thought my surname unsoiled in the annals of history. Today I found out otherwise.

Apparently, George W. Hensley was the founder of the modern snake handling movement. He died, unfortunately, from a snake bite.

Although this isn't really George, let's pretend that it is; I swear I'm not related to him. Or maybe I am. Oh well.

Can Counterfactuals Be True Or False?

Some philosophies and theologies depends on counterfactuals and the belief that these can be either true or false. However, there does seem to be problems with this line of thinking.

First, a counterfactual is a conditional whose antecedent is false and stated in the subjunctive instead of the indicative. For example: If I would have slept in this morning, I would have gotten fired. The antecedent is false, but, unlike a normal conditional, the conditional is not true simply because the antecedent is false. This is because it's a counterfactual; it's saying "I know the antecedent is false, but what if it were true?"

Second, some have relied on possible worlds to determine which counterfactuals are true. That is, when one looks at the possible world(s) that are "closest" to the actual world, the counterfactuals that obtain in this world(s) are true counterfactual conditions in the actual world. Yet, how does one determine which possible world is closest to the actual world? Are there not an infinite number of possible worlds? Presumably the response would be: The possible world that is closest to the actual world is the possible world that is exactly the same as the actual world except for the one fact that this counterfactual in the actual world is a fact in the possible world. This seems to satisfy the problem, except for this counter-example: I can imagine a second possible world that is exactly the same as the actual world (including the status of this counterfactual) except one other fact that is the same in the actual world and the first possible world (for example, my eye color). The first and second possible world are exactly the same as the actual world excepting one fact each; however, the counterfactual in question obtains in one possible world and not in the other. Which world is closest to the actual world?

Third, thoughts like these have led some to consider it impossible to test whether a counterfactual is true or not. How does one test a counterfactual? If one can actually do a test, then the counterfactual is no longer a counterfactual, but a fact. It then seems impossible to empircally test a counterfactual. Any empirical epistemology is then left in a quandry.

Fourth, this has led some to conclude that counterfactuals are neither true nor false; they are meaningless. I like this option. What do you think?

Problems In The Philosophy Of Science

There has been much conversation lately in my life about the problems in the Philosophy of Science, and I thought I'd explain some of the things that I've discovered.

1. The basic problems of empiricism. An a posteriori belief is a belief based upon our experience. Most people have had times when their senses seemed to deceive them; e.g., Daniel wrote a post once about driving at night and having his senses deceived. He thought he saw a person on the side of the road, and slammed on the breaks. He looked again and saw only a trash can. He has then come to the belief that some a posteriori beliefs are mistaken: either there was a person or there was not. How, then does Daniel seek to rectify this problem? He can get out of the car, of course, and look around to see if there is a person hiding behind the trash can, or he may reason to the best conclusion. Surely, such an isolated incident isn't enough to give cause to question one's senses.

In fact, there is a general principle that many philosopher's use that states: believe your senses unless you have explicit reasons at a particular instance not to believe your senses; in that case, you might question that particular instance. They claim that even if your senses deceive you occasionally, there is no reason to completely reject them. However, how do we perceive a witness in court that has perjured himself? Do we not cast doubt on everything this perjurer says? But there is a more technical reason for rejecting the reliability of one's senses.

Our situation seems as follows: we accept the proposition that some a posteriori beliefs are mistaken (for this is why we even have a problem to begin with); we have a questionable a posteriori belief that we are testing to determine whether it is mistaken or not (was there a person or just a trash can on the side of the road?); and we seek to test this questionable a posteriori belief with another a posteriori belief. Do you not see the vicious circle? We are testing questionable a posteriori beliefs with other a posteriori beliefs whose credibilty are themselves in doubt (because we accept the principle that some--we don't know which ones--a posteriori beliefs are mistaken). This isn't just a small problem of trusting our senses excepting those times when we are consciously deceived; perhaps those times when we think we are deceived are the verdical beliefs, whereas the vast majority of our life we are being deceived. Who can tell?

2. The nature of scientific explanation. With what I've studied so far, I've not been able to discern any consensus on what makes an explanation scientific. The starting point for contemporary philosophers of science is with a man named Hempel. He believed that something is scientifically explained by setting up the discussion in a deductive syllogism. As one of your premises, you start with a law or laws of nature; the second premise would be your initial conditions (the conditions related to the event to be explained). Your conclusion would then be the event to be explained. This would work as both a predictive method and an explanatory method. For instance, imagine that there is a flag pole that casts a shadow of a particular length at a certain time of the day. What is the explanation of this phenomenon?

Hempel would assert that one should assert some laws of optics and the like, and then assert the initial conditions: namely, the degree of the height of the sun in the sky, the height of the flag pole, and etc. With this, one may deduce the length of the shadow and thus explain why the shadow is the length that it is. But, is there a problem here? In fact, there is. Let us assume the same situation, the same laws asserted and the same initial conditions, except that we exchante the height of the flag pole for the length of the shadow. Now, from this syllogism we can deduce the height of the flag pole; so now the length of the shadow explains the height of the flag pole! Even more queer is if we accept the same laws, but the initial conditions now include the height of the flag pole and the length of the shadow; we can now explain the degree of the height of the sun in the sky!

Well, suffice it to say, no one really holds to Hempel's account today. One of the leading possibillites to replace Hempel is Salmon's statistical relevance model (S-R). This states that a scientific explanation simply asserts every statistically relevant factor in regards to the explanadum. For instance, why did the mayor get paresis? (Paresis is a disease that results from untreated syphilis, however it occurs in only small percentage of cases of untreated syphilis). The S-R response is simply that the mayor had syphilis. There is no other statistically relevant factor; this has been scientifically explained. However, how do we explain why the mayor got paresis whereas his wife (who also had untreated syphilis) did not? Salmon cannot offer an explanation.

Bas C. van Fraaseen (which is a rad name) offers an account that seems radically different from any previous account. He states that an explanation is simply an answer to a question; the important step is finding which question is being asked. For example, if I were to ask "Why did Mrs. S shoot Mr. S?" I could be asked several questions:

1. Why did Mrs. S shoot Mr. S? - Why Mrs. S did it and not someone else.
2. Why did Mrs. S shoot Mr. S? - Why Mrs. S shot him instead of kissing him.
3. Why did Mrs. S shoot Mr. S? - Why Mrs. S shot Mr. S and not the maid.

In order to determine what question is being asked, one first names a topic: P(k). For an example, let us take question 1. The topic is something like "Mrs. S." Next, we need a contrast class: X. The contrast class X would be something like: Mrs. S; the main; the butler; the mail man; the mayor who has paresis; etc. The contrast class is basically saying: "Why Mrs. S and not any other member of X; so, why did Mrs. S, and not the maid (for example), shoot Mr. S?" The last part of van Fraassen's explanatory account is the relevance relation. It it this relevance relation that "picks" out the topic from all the other options in the contrast class. Thus, it seems, a scientific explanation is a story and we need to supply the missing part of the story in order to give an explanation.

Some have objected to van Fraassen's account because he does not give any real criteria for determining what a relevance relation must be. In fact, he says that a relevance relation must not pick out only the topic from the contrast class, but must just weed the selection pool down. One counter example given to his account of explanation is the question "Why is the sky blue?" The topic is "blue" and the contrast class might be: blue, white, red, yellow and etc. The relevance relation could be: Because the grass is green. This satisfies all requirements of van Fraassen's account. It seems to fail.

Well, I'm not going to go on about explanation, but my point is this: there is no consensus as to what makes an explanation scientific versus pseudo-scientific. This seems a problem.

3. The nature of causality. While many philosophers of science have sought, because of the inherent problems, to remove causality from their theories; however, some still insisnt on using the idea of causality. Briefly let me state this: in asking what caused something I am asking for the necessary and sufficient conditions that brought about the event in question. Suppose, for instance, I ask why the match lit when I struck it on a matchbook. What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for this to happen? A necessary condition is a condition that needs to obtain in order for an event to take place (e.g., it is necessary that a mother be a woman). A sufficient condition is a condition that if it obtains the event in question takes place (e.g., one might say that a sufficient condition for the ground being wet is for it to be raining). A necessary condition need not be sufficient; e.g., our example concerning a mother: while a mother must be a woman, being a woman does not necessitate that one is a mother. A sufficient condition may not be necessary; e.g., it does not need to be raining in order for the ground to be wet, there could be sprinklers.

A set of conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for a given event seem to be a cause of that event. So, let us harken back to the match that lit. What caused this match to burn? What are the necessary and sufficient conditions? Did striking the match cause it to burn? Is striking a match necessary and/or sufficient? If a match is placed in a chamber and the temperature is raised to the temperature at which paper kindles, the match will combust without the aid of being struck. Thus, being struck is not necessary. If a match is placed in a chamber without oxygen, and is struck repeatedly, the match will not burn. Striking a match is not sufficient. Does striking a match then play any part in causing the match to burn? We want to say, "yes", but our reason may lead us to say "no". This is similar to Zeno's paradoxes of motion.

What is causality? Hume's example is of billiard balls. When we see one billiard ball hit a second billiard ball, the second ball starts to move. Did the first one cause the second one to move? All we see is the first hitting the second, and then the second moving. How is this causality? Last night I turned off the lights in my living room, and a few moments later it started to snow outside. Surely this is causality. We might object that the lights had nothing to do with the snow; but how do we know this? What do the billiard balls have to do with each other? Hume answered that because of spatial contiguity and temporal succession we come to expect this regularity and then because of a hasty generalization we call it "causality." Can we escape this argument? Not all scientific explanations rely on the notion of causality (some reject it outright), but some do; certain popular science thinks that causality is important. Any Christian who believes in the cosmological argument must believe in causality; how can one prove it empirically?

4. The nature of laws. A professor of mine has stated to be that his friends in the physics world admit that physicists have not discovered one law of nature. (This, of course, distinguishes between laws of nature and laws of science). More interesting (at least to me) is not whether physicists have found any laws of nature, but whether there is even such a thing as a law of nature to be found. What is a law? There are several views which seek to explain the nature of laws, and they all, seemingly, have fatal flaws. One account which is sometimes call the naive regularity view by its opponents states that a law is a law if it can be stated in a true universal conditional. For instance, Newton's first law is something like: "If the net impressed force on an object is zero, then the object moves inertially." This can be stated (just for you Tim) in the predicate logic form of: for all (x)(Fx->Gx). In English: for all x, if the net impressed force on x is zero, then x moves inertially.

Now, this is a true statement because the conditional is true. Why is it true? Not because the antecedent and consequent are both true, but because the antecedent is false. If the antecedent is false, it does not matter whether the consequent is true or not; the conditional is true. There is no object (according to modern physics) that has a net impressed force of zero. So, let us consider an example: If the next impressed force on the moon is zero, then the moon moves inertially. Now, the net impressed force on the moon is not zero, therefore it doesn't matter if the moon actually moves inertially or not; the conditional is true, just not true of anything in reality. One may show the absurdity of this by giving another "law": If the net impressed force on the moon is zero, then the moon does NOT move inertially. This, also, is a law. Want to get more absurd? If the net impressed force on the moon is zero, then the moon is made of cheese. This is a true conditional; a law of nature. Well, perhaps these aren't laws of nature, but how does one distinguish between a law of nature and a pseudo-law?

There are other accounts of laws such as modal necessity. Modal necessity states that something is a necessary truth if and only if it is true in all possible worlds. However, the laws of nature are not true in all possible worlds (although, personally, I don't like the notion of possible worlds), for certainly the force of gravity could have varied inversely as the cube of the distance and not the square. It is conceivable. However, proponent might wish to say that the laws of nature are not logically necessary but nomologically necessary. This reduces to the truism that the laws of nature are true in all possible worlds where they are true. Another solution must be found, but there is no agreement as to the solution. My prof stated our problem in the following technical language: "We're screwed."

5. Realism versus anti-realism. I shall comment on briefly on this issue in the Philosophy of Science. Realism states that it is the aim of science to literally describe the universe. That is, if one is a realist, one need not think that a particular theory actually describes the world, but one believes that it is attempting to do so; when one accepts a particular theory one accepts it conditionally that it is attempting to describe reality. The anti-realist states that it is not the goal of science to literally describe reality. There are two main types of anti-realists: those who think that the theories in science do indeed explain reality, but only by taking the scientific theory metaphorically (or only after demythologizing it); and those who think that scientific theories ought to be taken literally, but not take them as true. Thus, if science asserts the existence of elections the two anti-realists will take this assertion as follows: 1. this is just a metaphor or mythology for stating something true about the universe 2. this theory really does assert that there are electrons, but just because I am committed to the theory does not mean that I think that this claim is true.

Is the purpose of science to discover or to invent? This is a quesiton that even pagan philosophers argue over. It seems that far too often Christians assume that science is meant to discover.

6. Lastly, there is one figure in the Philosophy of Science that I'm wanting to read up on; his name is Feyerabend. I suggest looking at something like Wikipedia to get a very brief introduction to some of the "radical" things he has to say. Is he right?

Some Further Clarifications On General Revelation

I'm gong to try to make this post clear and concise.

1. When God creates men He endows them with certain innate ideas. It is THESE propositions that are the constituents of general revelation; not creation itself. This is the idea expressed in John 1 where it says that Jesus is the light which enlightens all men coming into the world. I do not know the extent of these propositions, but know that they must include some information about God's attributes and the like.

2. Because men are sinful, they supress this knowledge. I take this to mean that they do not believe these propositions "implanted" by God. I do not think that the Scriptures necessitates that we all believed these propositions at one point in time. If one wanted to maintain that we did at one time believe these, then I think they would have a frightful time explaining what, exactly, this means. Of course I can say that man knows these propositions in that they are innately within every man's mind. They do not know them in that they believe them; though, some in fact do know them in this manner (e.g., Christians). We just have them innately in our mind, though many (possibly most?) of us never consciously consider them.

3. Nature is, in fact, not a natural order arrived at via evolution. It is a created order. As someone who believes certain truths about God and creation, I can look at a mountain or the sky and see the glory of God.

4. Christianity is simply the collection of doctrines/propositions revealed in the Scriptures. In order to look at nature and understand perfectly what God intends for us to see in nature would require that one perfectly understands and believes all the propositions in Scripture. I do not think anyone has done this, so I do not think anyone perfectly understands or comprehends the glory of God in nature. My point is this: this isn't just an either or thing. One doesn't understand general revelation or not. I think this is Russ Moore's point in saying that we must refer to the Bible to "correct" ID. Though I disagree in his point that ID proves too much (or anything at all), I do accept his view that we must go to the Scriptures. Why?

5. There may be pagans who are not Christians that believe SOME but not all of the propositions revealed in the Scriptures. Thus, there may be a pagan outthere that believes that there was a really powerful God that created the world, though he doesn't believe the god was omnipotent. Well, he looks at creation and sees the results of this really powerful god. We would say that he has some of it right, but not all. Not even close to enough. This is because he only believes that there is a limited god and not an omnipotent God. But note well, this pagan was not convinced by nature that a god existed, but because he believed a god existed he saw the results of this god in nature.

6. Likewise, there may be another pagan who believes more than this previous pagan. He believes that there is an omnipotent God. Thus, when he looks at nature he sees the results of this omnipotent God. However, he believes nothing about this God's righteousness or his own sinfulness. But note well, this pagan believed and then look at nature and understood something.

7. In addition to this, there might be a third pagan who not only believes in an omnipotent God, but this God's righteous requirement that creation not be worshiped, and his own sinfulness at doing so. He then looks at nature and sees that it was created and not worth worshipping. But note, however, that this pagan believed first and then looked at nature to see the results of this righteous God.

8. My point is this, by pointing to nature, an unbeliever will not "see" anything of God's glory (even if a mistaken view of some of the previously mentioned pagans) unless they first believe those very propositions in question about God and His righteous requirement.

9. So, my question is not whether someone has to be a Christian before they understand ANYTHING that God intends for us to see in creation, my question is this: Can a man understand ANYTHING that God intends for us to see in creation without first believing those very things? That is, will an atheist see nature as God's created order BEFORE he believes that there is a God and that this God created the nature that he now sees?

10. Finally, to sum up, my point is that people who disagree with me here are putting the cart before the horse. Either the person will believe that God created nature or not. Either way, pointing them to nature to prove anything or to get them to believe anything is pointless. God cannot be found first in a canyon. One must find Him in the Scriptures, and then once that person believes, he can see the canyon for what it is: the creation of God. But not before.

I Don't Want To Be Accused

I don't want to be accused of misrepresenting Dr. Mohler on the topics of Lewis and Tolkien that I discussed below, so I will post a few quotations from Dr. Mohler's website.

"C. S. Lewis was one of the most influential Christian intellectuals of the twentieth century. For American evangelicals, he has become a model and mentor for literary expression, apologetic engagement, and the dignity of intellect. Nevertheless, Lewis was often not a careful theologian. He was an inclusivist on the question of salvation, believing that at least some who did not consciously believe in Christ would be saved. He rejected the inerrancy of Scripture and was never adequately specific about his understanding of the atonement. He was a firm defender of orthodoxy on doctrines such as the Trinity, but apparently accepted baptismal regeneration and never adequately affirmed justification by faith." (Article)

Now, I don't know if there is any excuse for Mohler. What, then, is a Christian? Yay, Lewis supported the Trinity but denied just about everything else!

As for Tolkien, Mohler says:

"J. R. R. Tolkien was a deeply Christian man whose literary vision and fantastic tales were intended to point to eternal realities. A fervent Roman Catholic, Tolkien was influenced by John Henry Cardinal Newman, in whose oratory Tolkien and his brother received early education." (Article)

Wait, wait. Correct me if I'm wrong here. A fervent Romanist would include denying the gospel right? But, according to Mohler, Tolkien was a "deeply Christian man". What does "Christian" even mean to Mohler?

Ah well. Just wanted to cover my bases.

A Few Comments On First Principles

In the course of a conversation below, the issue of presuppositions (or first principles) was broached. I have a few things to say on the subject:

Presuppositions are arbitrary. While there are many reasons why people choose the presuppositions that they have, there are no reasons that prove or establish one's presuppositions. For example, let us suppose that my daughter accepts the axiom of Scripturalism, namely that the Bible alone is the Word of God. Why would she choose this? Presumably it will be, at least partly, because I have raised her to believe that it is so. Or, for another example, an atheist may accept his presuppositions because he was raised by other atheists. These are, of course, only partial explanations; if Scripturalism is true and Sophia does accept it, then it will be not only because she was raised to accept them but also because God decided that it be so.

However, if we search for a reason why one should accept the Scripturalist's axiom, then we will be left without an answer. This is, however, not a unique position for Christianity, as I have tried to make clear in a previous post. So, the Scripturalist's axiom is something like: The Bible alone is the Word of God. However, it is a little more complicated than this. In presupposing this proposition, we presuppose what we mean by the word Bible. We do not merely presuppose a word, but the word has content. We also do not merely presuppose the list of sixty-six books in the Bible, but the content of those sixty-six books. We are not empiricists, and so when we read the Bible and think that Ephesians 2 states that it is by grace that we are saved, we assume that this is what it actually says. Of course, we admit that it could actually say, "It is not by grace that we are saved . . . " Who is to say? I presuppose that it doesn't, because this is part of my axiom. We also presuppose what we mean by God and Word. But we also presuppose certain propositions that form our hermeneutic.

This means that many of the debates raging concerning certain texts of the Scripture can never be resolved simply by longer and longer exegesis of the passage. Often it is simply a war of hermeneutics, which is simply a war of presuppositions. In this case, what is needed is not evidence, but a metaphorical hammer to destroy the other person's axiom and then show that yours can survive criticism. Does this, then, guarantee that our presuppositions are true? No. We admit an objective truth that is true regardless of what we think, however we can only find this truth by assuming a starting point and hoping that this is, in fact, true. However, when we assume a starting point, that starting point determines what we consider to be true or false; in fact, we may be mistaken.

So, what if I have certain presuppositions that X cannot possibly be true because it is inherently contradictory or it contradicts certain presuppositions to which I hold? An example of the former would be something like: God can show us a new reality where He can create a round square. To deny this statement is not to deny that God is omnipotent, but, rather, to say that this statement is nonsense. It is inherently contradictory. A round square cannot consistently be imagined or thought. An example of X contradicting certain presuppositions to which I hold would be: Suppose someone stated that a new scientific finding shows that Jesus never actually lived. I would reject this out of hand because it contradicts something I presuppose.

Now, let us suppose that I am reading the Bible and find that verse Z teaches that X is true; however, I, for either of the two reasons previously stated, believe it to be impossible for X to be true. What am I to do? In a comment below I gave only one option, but there really are two. First, I can dismiss my reading of Z; I must have misread it for certainly one of my presuppositions about the Bible is that it cannot contradict itself. Second, I may question the presupposition (let us call it Y) which X contradicts, or, if I believe X to be inherently contradictory, then I may reconsider whether X is actually self-contradictory.

But note well, even if I were to question Y, it would not be on the basis of some neutral criterion such as the Bible. I can only "get to" the Bible through W (the collective set of my presuppositions excepting Y) in order to see if Y is worth holding to or not. So, in effect, I am judging a presupposition (Y) on my other presuppositions (W). If I find that Y does not contradict W, then I am probably going to continue to believe Y. I think, however, that people actually rarely question their presuppositions because of a conclusion reached. This is because it is the purpose of the presuppositions to judge your derivative beliefs and not vice versa. However, a possible state of affairs is thus: suppose that I come to conclude that the Z teaches X, but X contradicts Y. I then question Y by means of W and find no problem here. The problem must be with my interpretation of Z. So I return to Z and take great caution to ensure that I am interpreting Z in accordance with V (V is equal to W plus Y). However, I still come to conclude that Z teaches X. At this point I may become convinced that there is, in fact, a problem with my presuppositions. Or I may be convinced that I am a bad exegete; there is nothing wrong with my presuppositions but I keep messing up with Z. I can leave it alone and move on. These seem to be my two options.

If I take the first course and question my presuppositions, then I would need to question more than just Y in light of W; I would need to question U in light of T (where U and T are maximal subsets of V). Geez, I swore I would never turn into the standard analytic philosopher that uses all those letters. Oh well.

So, I'm not sure if I've cleared things up at all, but let me apply this to Romans 1 in light of our debate on general revelation. Because of my presuppositions about language, propositions, revelation, and the like (given in a previoius post) then I must conclude that it is impossible for Romans 1 to teach that any man can see nature and come to any valid and true belief concerning God without already believing those things already. This is what I think Paul means when he says that they suppress the truth; that is, they cease to believe it. When someone ceases to believe that there is a God or any related propositions about creation, they will not see the glory of God displayed in nature. They must believe first. General revelation is not creation itself, but it is the propositions given to all men that if believed would cause them to see nature as creation instead of as merely nature. But men darkened their hearts by refusing to believe these propositions; they did not disbelieve them because God did not make it evident to them, namely giving them innate knowledge. They disbelieved them because they (we) were wicked.

As such, pointing unbelievers to nature is not more useful than sending them to a crappy summer camp; they are both equally useless in the field of valid argumentation. This is not to deny that some pagans will see the evidence of God in creation, but this is because they already believe that some god created nature; we have not proven anything to them. If we point someone to nature or the supposed design in nature, we will accomplish one of two things: 1. the person will already believe that nature was created by God and thus will accomplish nothing or 2. the person will not believe that nature was created by God, the person will reject our conclusion about creation and we will have accomplished nothing. See my point?

Let me know if I left something out.

Some Interesting Introductions To Epistemology

As some of you know, I think that Gordon Clark was quite keen. I think his contributions to the field of epistemology are invaluable, however I want to make sure that I am clear that I don't think he is the only thing you should read on it. There are many great pieces out there on the state of contemporary epistemology; the problem is that Clark is correct, whereas most of the others are not. Ha. With that said, a brief introduction to a Scripturalist epistemology can be found in the following articles from the Trinity Foundation:

How Do We Learn? - A brief discussion of empiricism

An Introduction To Gordon H. Clark - Well, it's a good introduction to Scripturalism (including our epistemology.

Also I would highly recommend the book Christian Philosophy by Gordon Clark. It is actually a collection of three of his books: Three Types of Religious Philosophy; Religion, Reason, and Revelation; and An Introduction to Christian Philosophy.

Unfortunately . . .

Unfortunately, the following is from Purgatorio, and was actually said by the pastor of the church we used to attend:

God picks you from the patch, washes all the dirt off you, opens you up and
removes the seeds of sin. Carves a smile on your faceand puts His light inside you, for all the world to see.

Now, this is pretty sad.

You Have Got To Check This Out

Try visiting Purgatorio and browsing around.

It is pretty funny.

There are a couple of posts that you should check out:

You Might Be Emerging If . . . - This is a spoof on the emerging church movement.

Help! I'm Going Hyper! - This is a spoof on people who really love calvnism.

Only if I could be as funny.

Some Clarifications On General Revelation

In light of some of the discussion generated by my post Moore Or Less To The Point, I have decided to make some clarifications on my views of general revelation. I do not have all the answers, but while looking for the answers I am most definately working within a particular framework of presuppositions.

First, all revelation, whether general or special, is propositional. A proposition is the meaning of a declarative sentence. An imperative, for example, is, strictly speaking, meaningless. "Run up the stairs!" is neither true nor false. However, when someone says, "Run up the stairs!" we understand this by means of a proposition that can be expressed by the declarative sentence: "So-and-so is commanding me to run up the stairs." This statement is true or false. When God, in the Scriptures, commands, "Repent and be saved!", we understand this by means of a proposition that can be expressed in the declarative sentence: "God commands me to repent and be saved."

Any talk about revelation being personal is lost upon me if one means anything other than God is a person and reveals propositions to us, who are also persons. If one wants to retreat to mystic metaphor, neo-orthodox encounter, or whatever, then I have no notion of what is being said. This view that I am espousing implies that a tree is not a revelation. Revelation must be a proposition and a proposition alone.

Second, propositions are expressed via language, and all propositions can, in principle, be expressed in language. One must make allowances for a broader understanding of this point. For instance, it is, in principle, possible to express the entirety of the Scriptures via smoke signals; however, one might run out of wood before the Pentateuch is completed. There also may be a language where they have no word for "happy", but it is not the fault of language but of the vocabulary of that particular language. One could easily make up a word for happy.

With this stated, there is no thought cannot be expressed with words. There are no thoughts about God that are beyond words. The only things that are "beyond" words are, I would say, nonsense and qualia. Qualia is the subjective experience of sensation. When I look at a tomato, I can tell you about the tomato, but I cannot express the actual color that I experience when I see it because the color red, in this instance, is not an object of knowledge but of experience. This is to say that revelation is not approximately true or analogically true. It is literally true. To say that God is good is not to bring God down to our level; it is not, as some pious souls would have you believe, more untrue than it is true. Language does not bring God down to our level, but, in some sense, it is God bringing us up to His level.

Third, language consists in signifiers that point in some way to things that are signified. The letters "G-O-D" are not special letters, but per our convetion of language we recognize that this combination of letters signifies God. Or, similarly, the letters "R-E-D" are simply, according to our convention, the combination of letters that signifies the qualia that we experience when we look at a ripe tomato or blood, for instance. (Wittgenstein's discussion of this subject--his beetle in the box analogy--is quite interesting; maybe I'll do a post about that later). With this said, signifiers do not have to be words as understood in common parlance. Hand signals in Sign Language would qualify as signifiers. In fact, it is quite possible that blinks of an eye, stones on the ground, or puffs of smoke from a campfire could be signifiers of propositions.

Fourth, what makes something a signifier is a convention between people. I assume one could say that a convention of language could be made with oneself: Daniel has made for his book a language that only he himself knows. However, the language could not be used to communicate to someone else. So, in order for there to be a language, there must be a convention amongst people as to what counts as a signifier and what the signifiers mean. Of course, this is a little compressed: one would need to understand more than semantics; one would need syntax and, presumably, pragmatics. With that said, one can not look at a sheet of Cuneiform and expect to understand it without having partaken of the convention that stipulated what each signifier in Cuneiform represented. This is what we do when we learn English in school; namely, partake of the convetion of the English language.

One would need to know the convention of a particular language before one could understand what is being signified. And once one knows the convention of the language, they can understand what is being communicated. Now, if one wanted to assert that nature, in some way, is a language, albeit a very simple language, then one could do so. By calling nature a language I would mean that the mountains and hills and rivers are somehow signifiers much like the letters on this page are; they are meant to signify something. However, one must understand and believe the convention of that language prior to "reading" nature. And since, given the previous discussion, general revelation would not be nature itself but the conventions of the language of nature (or to say it in another way: general revelation would be the propositions about God and the creation that we would need to know prior to seeing the attributes of God declared in nature), we must conclude that general revelation is something innate in us.

What does this mean in connection with our discussion? It means that in order for someone to look at nature and "see" the attributes of God, one must already understand and believe the conventions of the language of nature; namely they must already understand and believe truths about God and the created order. In this case, trying to prove the existence of God from nature requires that one already accept that God exists and nature is His creation. This is not a problem for me, because I already believe this. So when I look at creation I can see God's immutable power, because I understand and believe certain truths about God and creation. However, to a Darwinist who does not believe those truths about nature and God, this talk of design and general revelation is nonsense. It is as if we are showing him a piece of paper with scribble from a child. He has first to believe that it is a language and then, eventually, understand and believe the conventions (or propositions) about that language.

If we direct a Darwinist to nature and say: "See, it declares the attributes of God!" He will turn to us and say, "You poor, dear fellow. For you to say that nature tells us anything about God is akin to me pointing to tracks on the ground made by deer and saying, 'See this is an exposition of Euclid's axiomatic geometry!'"

I hope my point is coming across: nature doesn't delcare anything to anyone unless and until they accept certain truths about God and creation. Then and only then does it actually communicate anything to us. But, by this point, we are already Christians! We must first convince that Darwinist that Christianity is true before we can convince him that nature "declares" anything to us at all. But this is simply saying we must get the Darwinist to understand and believe the Bible before we can get them to understand what nature is saying to us. However, this poses a problem because the supporter of ID thinks that this is backwards. He wants some point of contact between the believer and unbeliever, when, in fact, there is none. However, Moore's admission that we have to go to the Bible to get "the truth" about God and creation is telling. Nature isn't enough to prove the truth, in fact, according to Moore it "proves too much", though, of course, I would say it proves nothing. The ID proponent wants to use the Darwinist's own premises to prove the existence of God, but this is impossible because the Darwinist must first accept certain presuppositions of the Christian, which is entirely the point at issue.

Now, this is not to say that pagans do not look at the starry sky above and think that there must be a creator of all this. In this case, it would be a pure accident that this gentleman believed the truth. There are several ways, I suppose, that this could be considered accidental. Firstly, many people look at human history and say, "This shows that man is inherently good." Others look at human history and say, "This shows that man is inherently evil.' Still others look at human history and say, "This shows absolutely nothing about the moral make-up of man." You are going to get men of all three persuasions; I would say that the last gentleman is correct, the second is correct in his conclusion but fallacious in his reasoning. The point is this: there are, presumably, a finite number of options as to nature being created: either it was or it wasn't. You will get pagans opining both options; that some happen to be right does not mean that their method is appropriate. A child may guess the correct problem to a differential calculus equation, but that does not mean that his method was appropriate.

Now, let me try to make it all make sense. God creates us with innate propositions; facts about Him and creation. However, as sinners we either fail to understand these propositions or fail to believe them. So, when we look at nature we do not see creation, but evolution. Or, we only understand and believe some of the propositions so we get a skewed belief about the Creator and the creation. Or, possibly, we do not understand or believe any of these God-given propositions, but through our pagan philosophies we come to believe certain propositions that are akin to the God-given ones that cause us to conclude that there is a really powerful femine god that created the world. And so on. That Moore had to retreat to the Scriptures (always a good thing) in order to make sure that we understand nature correctly only strengthens my point: we must understand and believe the Scriptures before nature "says" anything true to us. But by this point, we are already Christians and it is pointless to point to nature to prove the existence of God because we already believe in Him if we "see" anything true in nature. (Again, there are accidents were people correctly guess something. For instance, a person who doesn't know a bit of Greek may rightly guess that nomos means law, but we would not say that they are correctly reading Greek.)

Revelation is always propositional; nature doesn't "tell" us anything about God unless and until we are already Christians and thus "speaking the language" that God is using in nature. To further complicate matters, there is still the epistemological problems of empiricism and the philosophical problems of science. If you expect the goal of science to be truth, then you are going to be disappointed. However, if you think that the goal of science is to invent useful things, then it doesn't matter what the Darwinist says. Let me know if this makes my position more clear to yall.

Moore or Less To The Point

While I happen to like Russ Moore's writings very much, I do not like some of his philosophical convictions. On his blog (Moore To The Point) at the Henry Institute web site, one of his entries for today is about Darwinism and the Intelligent Design movement. Moore says:

I have long been concerned with what I call the "dark side" of Intelligent Design. I am supportive of ID as far as it goes, pointing out the intellectual incoherence of Darwinism. But, at the same time, ID, left by itself, proves too much. Without divine revelation, the "design" of nature is red in tooth and claw. Unless we point to an alternative story, one that shows us that death is ultimately unnatural, the result of a cosmic curse (Gen 3; 1 Cor 15), we will have the same result as that of natural theology: namely, those most attentive to nature will recoil from the Creator as, at best, inattentive, and, at worst, malevolent.

There are several things stated here to which I would like to call attention. First, I congratulate Moore on wanting to show that Darwinism is incoherent. However, I am left a little confused as to how the ID movement contributes to this at all. Surely the only way to show Darwinism to be incoherent is on an ad hominem basis. One must assume the premises of Darwinism and deduce a contradiction. Perhaps part of the ID movement does this, but it seems that the ID movement qua the ID movement adds little to this. Merely giving a different interpretation of the "facts" of science does not show Darwinism to be incoherent at all.

Second, Moore says that the ID movement proves too much. On the contrary, the ID movement does not prove anything. It seems the best argument that could be given for the ID movement is "If God created the universe, then we would see significant evidence of design. We do see significant evidence of design, therefore God created the universe." This is, of course, the fallacy of asserting the consequent. It seems that the ID crew would love to construct a modus ponens akin to "If there is significant evidence for design in the universe, then God created the universe. There is design. God did it." Or in predicate logic it might be stated (x)(Fx->Gx) where x, in our particular instance, is equal to the universe and F is "shows evidence of design" then G is "is created by God". However, I don't know any Darwinian who would accept this conditional.

That is, the falsity of a conditional is determined by the consequent (in this case, Gx). If this is false while the antecedent is true then the conditional is false. If they are both false, then it is true. The Darwinian has two options. They can deny that there is design in nature and then deny that God created the universe. In this case, the conditional asserted by the ID proponent is true, but pointless. There is no x to which this conditional actually applies. The Darwinian may also affirm the antecedent (i.e., that there is design, or apparent design, in nature) and deny the consequent and thus the conditional is false. Their elucidation of funcational explanation seems to "explain" the occurance of apparent design.

We must also give heed to Hume. What does nature prove? Does it prove too much or not enough? Hume said that if it be granted that nature tells us anything about the creator, then we cannot ascribe to the cause more than the effect requires. As a Christian I think that Hume is correct. If we look at nature, we could either postulate a powerful, but not omnipotent, good God or a powerful, but not omnipotent, demon.

Third, Moore seeks to bring in divine revelation only to "correct" what nature proves. If this is the case, then why appeal to nature at all? It is as if Moore says, "Look at the design in nature, it proves God!" And then when people start questioning what kind of design nature actually shows, he says, "Don't look at the design, look at the Bible!" Which one is it? Shall we draw conclusions from the supposed design in nature or not?

Fourth, this is an example of another evangelical who has made an issue to question particular conclusions of particular scientists instead of questioning the foundations of science itself. This seems to betray a lack of understanding of the issues currently and historically debated in epistemology and the philosophy of science. It pleased the Lord that man could not come to know him through the wisdom of the world; this means science--eye has not seen, nor has ear heard.

Contrary to reports published abroad by leading evangelicals, Darwinism, or neo-Darwinism, is not on a rapid decline. The academy is still committed to it; in fact, scientific creationism or ID is routinely given as the paragon of pseudo-science. Let us not trust in the vagaries of scientific pontification; let us return to the Scriptures.

Descartes' Discontent

I have recently been engaged in a very minor discussion on a message board and the topic of Descartes was broached. My interlocutor asserted that Descartes showed, once and for all, that any attempt at constructing a deductive epistemology was bound to fail. He believed that Descartes' problem was that he sought to construct a deductive epistemology, and one should embrace an epistemology that is based upon induction. I'm not going comment on this gentleman's suggestion about which epistemology one ought to construct--I think he was dreadfully confused--but I do wish to say one thing about Descartes.

Descartes' problems do not spring from his attempt to create a deductive epistemology, nor do they spring from his attempt at gaining certainty, as the empiricists say. They spring from his attempt at gaining a meta-criterial certainty, or as my friend Daniel says: a meta-certainty.

What do I mean? Well, as of the publication of this entry I have a quotation from Gordon H. Clark on the top, right-hand corner of my blog: "Every philosophy must have a first principle, a first principle laid down dogmatically." This issue is, in some circles (most notably with Chisholm), called the problem of the criterion. There are some beliefs that are, in some sense, epistemically basic. For instance, no argument can be given in favor of the reliability of the senses or memory without first presupposing either one of these two things to be true. That is, I cannot give a consistent argument that what I remember to be true unless I first presuppose that my memory is, in fact, true. Or in the realm of the reliability of the senses: I see a door in front of me. Can I be sure that the door is there just as my senses tell me? I could touch it to make sure, but then I'm still assuming that my sense of touch is accurate.

Now, this leads us to a problem beyond this. It is obvious that some beliefs must be presupposed, but what about others? What about beliefs like: David was king of Israel? Well, I could write a book about this--and after grad school, I intend to--but I shall simply repeat what Clark says: "Every philosophy must have a first principle, a first principle laid down dogmatically." I will not restrict a philosophy to having a first principle that is epistemically basic (though it seems that if one wants those beliefs, one's first principle must, at least, include them). For instance, if someone wants to take the New York Times as his first principle, then I say: "Go for it!" However, there does seem to be some rules. If a proposition is an axiom or first principle, then this designates its position within a deductive system; if one believes the truthfulness of, say, that you are reading this blog right now, most likely this belief is not assumed. You probably believe that you are reading this blog at this moment because your senses, in some manner, tell you that you are. Thus, you do not assume this truth, you assume the truthfulness of your senses and then infer that you are reading this blog.

This seems pedantic, but it is essential. One cannot properly respond, "Well I assume this proposition" when cornered by the irrationality of a position. For example, a pagan might claim that they believe in the inherent goodness of mankind because of his experience. When questioned what experience leads them to this conclusion, I have had them respond, after I have explained the necessity of assuming a starting point, "Well I just assume the goodness of man to be true." But this is an ad hoc response; this person has just admitted to believing that proposition because of another. Well, more on this later. What's the point and what's it got to do with Descartes?

When someone assumes a starting point, this is his criterion of truth. If something contradicts the starting point, one may reject the truthfulness of the proposition in question or reject one's criterion of truth. But it is this criterion of truth that determines what is true and false, as far as the subject-of-the-system is concerned. Not that assuming a starting point makes something true or false, but it determines what that person will consider true or false. But since this is all that one has to go on, this will have to do.

Now, within this sytem one may have certainty. This is the type of certainty that Descartes ought to have been pleased with. However, he did not even have this. What Descartes sought was a meta-criterial certainty. He sought to have a certainty that his criterion of truth was, in fact, true considered outside of that system constructed by his criterion of truth. Obviously this can't be done, because one must determine what is true or false by means of a criterion; one would then need a criterion for criterions. This would result in the unhappy conclusion that 1. your criterion wasn't your criterion after all, and 2. a vicious infinite regress.

So, Descartes' problem was not that he sought certainty or that he sought a deductive system, but rather he sought a meta-criterial certainty that cannot be had. If this is a little confusing, and I imagine that it is because it is a little compressed, I'll explain more. Just post me a comment.

A Brief Word To Al Mohler On Lewis And Tolkien

There is an excellent article by John Robbins of the Trinity Foundation on C.S. Lewis that I think everyone ought to read: Did C.S. Lewis Go To Heaven?

However, I want to make a few comments about the evangelical adoption of Tolkien and Lewis; in particular I want to make a few comments on Al Mohler's adoption of these two men as patron saints of Literature.

First, if someone is a Catholic (e.g., Tolkien) and you want to refer to him as a Christian, you ought to go out of your way to show that either: 1. he did not understand the teachings of Rome or 2. he did not believe the teachings of Rome.

Second, if you (Mohler) are unaware of what Lewis actually said about Christianity, then please do not call him a Christian. If you are aware of what he said about Christianity and still call him a Christian, then please explain what you think Christianity is.

That's pretty much it, for now. We'll see if he responds to me. I just can't believe that someone with the professed concern for doctrinal purity as Dr. Mohler would refer to either of these two men as Christians without argument or qualification.

As far as I am aware of the teachings of Lewis and Tolkien, neither one of these two men were friends of a truly Scriptural worldview.

You Can't Hide Your Lying Eyes

A topic that is repeatedly brought up in regards to my Clarkian epistemology is this: trusting one's senses. It seems that most everyone will admit that their senses play tricks on them some times, but most will not admit that, for this reason, they should disbelieve their senses. To them this seems utterly ridiculous and impossible. In fact, Hume, probably the greatest modern "skeptic", stated that he could not help but believe his senses when he wasn't philosophizing. There is even debate whether Pyrrho the Greek skeptic had to be led around by friends; it seems that his distrust of his senses caused him to ignore dangerous obstacles in his way. However, this story is most likely false.

Many of the ancient skeptics, while believing that knowledge (epistēmē) could not be attained through the senses, did believe that one could have a non-doxastic attitude towards the senses. If, for instance, Pyrrho observed that a precipice stood before him, he did not have to believe that a precipice was actually before him, but rather could choose to act as if there was one. After all, one has to make a decision in life; one cannot do nothing, for even that is a decision. Thus this resulted in something called praxis. The skeptics would live by appearances and seek to fit in with society, while maintaining a non-doxastic attitude or stance towards the senses. If this is true, then the first sentence of this paragraph is not, strictly speaking, true. The ancient skeptics did not believe anything about the senses, knowledge or non-doxastic attitudes. In light of this, there is--as far as I am aware of--still debate as to whether: 1. the Pyrrhonians actually maintained a non-doxastic stance toward the senses, 2. the Pyrrhonians were actually committed to beliefs about beliefs by maintaining a non-doxastic attitude, and 3. whether it is actually possible to live without any beliefs.

I mention all this because I think that some good can be taken from our good friend Pyrrho. As a Clarkian I do not trust my senses to give me knowledge. It is this last clause, I think, that causes the hang up with most people. I trust my senses to give me opinions about the world, but this is not knowledge. However, opinion is often just as useful as knowledge. I whole-heartedly admit that God could be deceiving me at this moment in that I am not actually typing on my blog, but my opinion is that it is not so. (On a side note, I get so frustrated with Descartes. He, in the beginning of Meditations, affirms the Scriptures, and yet ignores the fact that God deceives people in the Scriptures. How can he, then, base his philosophy on the fact that God does not deceive?) I have no epistemic reason to believe either one way or the other, and so I do not pretend to have knowledge of this either one way or the other. I engage in a form of praxis: while I do not maintain a non-doxastic stance towards the majority (if any) of my empirical beliefs, I do simply live by appearances. And that, my friend, is all that one can ask of anyone.

So, in conclusion, I shall state that I have many empirical beliefs, but these beliefs are not useful in any manner for the pursuit of knowledge. We must use these beliefs to move about in the world as best we can, admitting that we could be mistaken about all that we see and hear. For instance: I am a scientific anti-realist; I believe that scientific theories are not meant to literally describe the world. They are meant to manipulate the environment and make predictions for our use (instrumentalism). However, since science is based upon empirical beliefs--and I do not invest any epistemic authority in my empirical beliefs--even our beliefs that a particular scientific theory is useful or has allowed us to make a large number of predictions is all opinion that may, in fact, turn out to be a fancy of our imagination.

I hope this clears the situation up a bit.

Am I Anti-American If I Say This?

Some of you may know that I support the Constitution Party because I do not support the Republican or Democratic Party. However, I started to wonder whether I actually support the Constitution of the United States. The truth is this: while I do think we ought to obey the law (though the politicians in Washington do not), I do not think that the Constitution is all that great of a document. Don't get me wrong here: I'm not denying that it has had a tremendous historical impact and what not. I'm simply saying that it appears (contrary to all the Christians out there who claim that we were founded on the basis of Christianity) that the country was actually founded upon pluralism. It just happens that the culture was not as diverse back then as it is now. As a Scripturalist and a pronomian (a political/philosophical term that Daniel, Tim and I have coined), I cannot support any constitution that does not explicitly state from whence all authority, morality and justice comes: namely the Scriptures.

While I do agree with much of what the Constitution states, I do not believe these things because the Constitution states them. For instance, I do not believe in small government because the Constitution asserts it (though, again, the politicians in Washington do not pay attention), but because I believe that the Scriptures give government only a small sphere of authority; to move beyond that sphere is to transgress the law of God.

Oh, and by the way, America is, quite possibly, in the process of creating an empire: Pax Americana! Soon, perhaps, we will be that great "evil empire". I'm telling you, per yesterday's post, the proletarian revolution is coming!

Good News, Comrades!

Good news, Comrades! As some of you may know, I'm doing my honors thesis this semester on Karl Marx. I want to share with you some of the interesting tidbits I've discovered. I know that many consider Marxism recondite and dead, it should be noted that at least China, North Korea and Cuba still hold to a form of communism that, at least, followed the lead of many of Marx's assertions.

The first thing that I want to clear up is the notion that the fall of the USSR showed conclusively that Marxism cannot work. This position could not be more mistaken. According to Cohen's technological interpretation of historical materialism, Marx believe that society started as a primitive classless, communistic society. When the productive forces (read: technology and labor power) reached a certain level of development, the production relations (read: who controls the means of production [read: technology] and the people who work said means of production) change to form pre-capitalist society. This includes feudalism and slavery. Eventually the forces of production developed enough so that the then current relations of production fettered the further development of the forces of production so that the production relations changed to form a captialist society.

Now, this step through capitalism is essential for Marx. While Marx considered capitalism bad in that it exploited and alienated the proletariat (read: those who own their own labor power but do not own the means of production), it was nevertheless an essential route through which society must go in order to reach socialism and, eventually, communism. Only capitalism could sustain the high level of development of the productive forces that needed to obtain in order for post-capitalist society to form. Post-capitalist society could not form when the productive forces were underdeveloped; it is akin to switching from first gear to fifth gear in a car. It would eventually stall.

So capitalism was a necessary evil (though there is much debate in the arena of Marxian ethics as to whether Marx was consistent in calling capitalism evil if ethical beliefs were relative to a particular class or society's ideology). Why is this important? Russia emancipated its serfs only in 1861; the Russian Revolution was in 1917. Less than 60 years separate Russia's departure from feudalism and its departure from capitalism. Russia was actually one of the most underdeveloped countries in the European sphere. Marx did think that it was possible for a country to skip capitalism (and for all intents and purposes Russia did in fact skip the stage of capitalism) and go straight to the proletarian revolution if and only if it were part of a wider proletarian revolution being undertaken in more advanced countries like Germany or England.

Lenin thought that measures could be taken in order to correct this and other problems, including the problem with labor unions. Labor unions seem like a good idea because it will allow the proletariat to achieve class consciousness by becoming a unified class. The tension would build and then the revolution would occur. This, however, is not what happened. Those involved in the labor unions became concerned only about getting more money for themselves. This actually relieved the tension from the proletariat and made the idea of revolution seem more distant. Lenin's response to the labor union problem and the underdevelopment of Russia was to create a vanguard party that would initiate the revolution with violence. You could either join or else die. It now seems pretty apparent that this was no solution to the underdevelopment of Russia.

The point is this: the fall of the USSR is no evidence that Marxism must fail; the USSR abandoned Marxism. Good news, comrades! We still have hope!

Abducing and Inducing

Ladies . . . Gentlemen . . . lend me your ears for my first post.

I shall, this day, talk briefly about induction and abduction. Both these words are often seen as abstruse nomenclature for fairly simple and necessary tasks in the searching out of truth. (By the way, is it just me or is the word 'abstruse' itself quite abstruse?) Abduction is simply reasoning to the best explanation and induction is making a general or universal conclusion based upon finite or limited evidence.

An example of the former is found in Tom Regan's book Empty Cages in which he argues for human and animal moral rights. He attempts to determine what it is about humans that gives them moral rights by considering seven different proposals. He rejects all of these for one reason or another, and then settles on a property of humans which he calls being a subject-of-a-life (SOAL). Being a SOAL means that one is somehow aware of one's environment and can have a better or worse life and it matters to that SOAL whether it has a better or worse life. From this he concludes that animals share this property with humans, and thus also share moral rights. The point is this: there really is no argument at all from Regan as to why being a SOAL should entail moral rights, except that he presupposed moral rights and concluded that being a SOAL is the best explanation for the existence of moral rights. Thus, this is an abduction.

An example of the latter, namely induction, is the experience of Europeans a few hundred years ago. Every swan that they had ever seen was white. S1 was white, S2 was white . . . Sn was white. After some time, it seems that the Europeans were justified in concluding that all swans are white. But note this well: they did not observe every swan either in the past, present or future. There was VERY limited evidence for a universal conclusion in the form of All X is Y. Imagine their surpirse when they arrived in Australia and found black swans! This is an induction, namely taking a body of limited "evidence" and making a universal conclusion.

Now, if it can't be deciphered, I shall make it manifest: I do not support induction or abduction in the search for truth. And it is this that I would like to make a few comments about.

First, I do not deny that one can arrive at truth via abduction or induction. For example, one might say that the best explanation of the order in nature that we see is a sovereign creator God. I agree that this is true. Where my problem lies is that this method of argumentation is completely invalid and fallacious. A child may guess correctly at a differential calculus problem, and some teenagers may stumble upon some metaphysical truth by using a Ouija Board; this I do not deny.

Second, I do not reject induction and abduction simply because they do not give certainty. Certainly (ha!) this is an important issue, but a related issue is, I believe, more fundamental. There is simply no justification for making an induction or abduction. Try as one may, there is absolutely no rational reason to be found for thinking that being a SOAL grants moral rights or that all swans are white based on the limited observations of Europeans-of-old. That is, there is no justification for anyone to think that either of these two judgments are true, though they both may, in fact, be true. (However, they are both, as far as I am concerned, false).

Third, I do not reject the use of induction and abduction. Here is where many people get caught at. As a Clarkian aren't I committed not to use either of these methods? The simple answer is: no. In fact, I whole-heartedly endorse induction and abduction for the use in science and every day life, provided that one is not deceived into thinking that a judgment arrived at through induction or abduction is meant to be litterally true or false. One may act or behave as if it were true, for surely we must make decisions and act according to our best guess in order to make it through the world. There is a view in the philosophy of science that is much akin to this called anti-realism. I am an anti-realist/skeptic on all empirical judgments, however I am an instrumentalist in that I whole-heartedly endorse both of these methods as instruments to manipulate the environment and to predict phenomenon (granting, of course, that no prediction can actually be epistemically confirmed).

These observations are essential to one's understanding of science. I shall, Lord willing, discuss the failure of evangelicalism to rightly question the legitimacy of science itself instead of particular conclusions held to by particular scientists.