A Few Comments On First Principles

In the course of a conversation below, the issue of presuppositions (or first principles) was broached. I have a few things to say on the subject:

Presuppositions are arbitrary. While there are many reasons why people choose the presuppositions that they have, there are no reasons that prove or establish one's presuppositions. For example, let us suppose that my daughter accepts the axiom of Scripturalism, namely that the Bible alone is the Word of God. Why would she choose this? Presumably it will be, at least partly, because I have raised her to believe that it is so. Or, for another example, an atheist may accept his presuppositions because he was raised by other atheists. These are, of course, only partial explanations; if Scripturalism is true and Sophia does accept it, then it will be not only because she was raised to accept them but also because God decided that it be so.

However, if we search for a reason why one should accept the Scripturalist's axiom, then we will be left without an answer. This is, however, not a unique position for Christianity, as I have tried to make clear in a previous post. So, the Scripturalist's axiom is something like: The Bible alone is the Word of God. However, it is a little more complicated than this. In presupposing this proposition, we presuppose what we mean by the word Bible. We do not merely presuppose a word, but the word has content. We also do not merely presuppose the list of sixty-six books in the Bible, but the content of those sixty-six books. We are not empiricists, and so when we read the Bible and think that Ephesians 2 states that it is by grace that we are saved, we assume that this is what it actually says. Of course, we admit that it could actually say, "It is not by grace that we are saved . . . " Who is to say? I presuppose that it doesn't, because this is part of my axiom. We also presuppose what we mean by God and Word. But we also presuppose certain propositions that form our hermeneutic.

This means that many of the debates raging concerning certain texts of the Scripture can never be resolved simply by longer and longer exegesis of the passage. Often it is simply a war of hermeneutics, which is simply a war of presuppositions. In this case, what is needed is not evidence, but a metaphorical hammer to destroy the other person's axiom and then show that yours can survive criticism. Does this, then, guarantee that our presuppositions are true? No. We admit an objective truth that is true regardless of what we think, however we can only find this truth by assuming a starting point and hoping that this is, in fact, true. However, when we assume a starting point, that starting point determines what we consider to be true or false; in fact, we may be mistaken.

So, what if I have certain presuppositions that X cannot possibly be true because it is inherently contradictory or it contradicts certain presuppositions to which I hold? An example of the former would be something like: God can show us a new reality where He can create a round square. To deny this statement is not to deny that God is omnipotent, but, rather, to say that this statement is nonsense. It is inherently contradictory. A round square cannot consistently be imagined or thought. An example of X contradicting certain presuppositions to which I hold would be: Suppose someone stated that a new scientific finding shows that Jesus never actually lived. I would reject this out of hand because it contradicts something I presuppose.

Now, let us suppose that I am reading the Bible and find that verse Z teaches that X is true; however, I, for either of the two reasons previously stated, believe it to be impossible for X to be true. What am I to do? In a comment below I gave only one option, but there really are two. First, I can dismiss my reading of Z; I must have misread it for certainly one of my presuppositions about the Bible is that it cannot contradict itself. Second, I may question the presupposition (let us call it Y) which X contradicts, or, if I believe X to be inherently contradictory, then I may reconsider whether X is actually self-contradictory.

But note well, even if I were to question Y, it would not be on the basis of some neutral criterion such as the Bible. I can only "get to" the Bible through W (the collective set of my presuppositions excepting Y) in order to see if Y is worth holding to or not. So, in effect, I am judging a presupposition (Y) on my other presuppositions (W). If I find that Y does not contradict W, then I am probably going to continue to believe Y. I think, however, that people actually rarely question their presuppositions because of a conclusion reached. This is because it is the purpose of the presuppositions to judge your derivative beliefs and not vice versa. However, a possible state of affairs is thus: suppose that I come to conclude that the Z teaches X, but X contradicts Y. I then question Y by means of W and find no problem here. The problem must be with my interpretation of Z. So I return to Z and take great caution to ensure that I am interpreting Z in accordance with V (V is equal to W plus Y). However, I still come to conclude that Z teaches X. At this point I may become convinced that there is, in fact, a problem with my presuppositions. Or I may be convinced that I am a bad exegete; there is nothing wrong with my presuppositions but I keep messing up with Z. I can leave it alone and move on. These seem to be my two options.

If I take the first course and question my presuppositions, then I would need to question more than just Y in light of W; I would need to question U in light of T (where U and T are maximal subsets of V). Geez, I swore I would never turn into the standard analytic philosopher that uses all those letters. Oh well.

So, I'm not sure if I've cleared things up at all, but let me apply this to Romans 1 in light of our debate on general revelation. Because of my presuppositions about language, propositions, revelation, and the like (given in a previoius post) then I must conclude that it is impossible for Romans 1 to teach that any man can see nature and come to any valid and true belief concerning God without already believing those things already. This is what I think Paul means when he says that they suppress the truth; that is, they cease to believe it. When someone ceases to believe that there is a God or any related propositions about creation, they will not see the glory of God displayed in nature. They must believe first. General revelation is not creation itself, but it is the propositions given to all men that if believed would cause them to see nature as creation instead of as merely nature. But men darkened their hearts by refusing to believe these propositions; they did not disbelieve them because God did not make it evident to them, namely giving them innate knowledge. They disbelieved them because they (we) were wicked.

As such, pointing unbelievers to nature is not more useful than sending them to a crappy summer camp; they are both equally useless in the field of valid argumentation. This is not to deny that some pagans will see the evidence of God in creation, but this is because they already believe that some god created nature; we have not proven anything to them. If we point someone to nature or the supposed design in nature, we will accomplish one of two things: 1. the person will already believe that nature was created by God and thus will accomplish nothing or 2. the person will not believe that nature was created by God, the person will reject our conclusion about creation and we will have accomplished nothing. See my point?

Let me know if I left something out.