Descartes' Discontent

I have recently been engaged in a very minor discussion on a message board and the topic of Descartes was broached. My interlocutor asserted that Descartes showed, once and for all, that any attempt at constructing a deductive epistemology was bound to fail. He believed that Descartes' problem was that he sought to construct a deductive epistemology, and one should embrace an epistemology that is based upon induction. I'm not going comment on this gentleman's suggestion about which epistemology one ought to construct--I think he was dreadfully confused--but I do wish to say one thing about Descartes.

Descartes' problems do not spring from his attempt to create a deductive epistemology, nor do they spring from his attempt at gaining certainty, as the empiricists say. They spring from his attempt at gaining a meta-criterial certainty, or as my friend Daniel says: a meta-certainty.

What do I mean? Well, as of the publication of this entry I have a quotation from Gordon H. Clark on the top, right-hand corner of my blog: "Every philosophy must have a first principle, a first principle laid down dogmatically." This issue is, in some circles (most notably with Chisholm), called the problem of the criterion. There are some beliefs that are, in some sense, epistemically basic. For instance, no argument can be given in favor of the reliability of the senses or memory without first presupposing either one of these two things to be true. That is, I cannot give a consistent argument that what I remember to be true unless I first presuppose that my memory is, in fact, true. Or in the realm of the reliability of the senses: I see a door in front of me. Can I be sure that the door is there just as my senses tell me? I could touch it to make sure, but then I'm still assuming that my sense of touch is accurate.

Now, this leads us to a problem beyond this. It is obvious that some beliefs must be presupposed, but what about others? What about beliefs like: David was king of Israel? Well, I could write a book about this--and after grad school, I intend to--but I shall simply repeat what Clark says: "Every philosophy must have a first principle, a first principle laid down dogmatically." I will not restrict a philosophy to having a first principle that is epistemically basic (though it seems that if one wants those beliefs, one's first principle must, at least, include them). For instance, if someone wants to take the New York Times as his first principle, then I say: "Go for it!" However, there does seem to be some rules. If a proposition is an axiom or first principle, then this designates its position within a deductive system; if one believes the truthfulness of, say, that you are reading this blog right now, most likely this belief is not assumed. You probably believe that you are reading this blog at this moment because your senses, in some manner, tell you that you are. Thus, you do not assume this truth, you assume the truthfulness of your senses and then infer that you are reading this blog.

This seems pedantic, but it is essential. One cannot properly respond, "Well I assume this proposition" when cornered by the irrationality of a position. For example, a pagan might claim that they believe in the inherent goodness of mankind because of his experience. When questioned what experience leads them to this conclusion, I have had them respond, after I have explained the necessity of assuming a starting point, "Well I just assume the goodness of man to be true." But this is an ad hoc response; this person has just admitted to believing that proposition because of another. Well, more on this later. What's the point and what's it got to do with Descartes?

When someone assumes a starting point, this is his criterion of truth. If something contradicts the starting point, one may reject the truthfulness of the proposition in question or reject one's criterion of truth. But it is this criterion of truth that determines what is true and false, as far as the subject-of-the-system is concerned. Not that assuming a starting point makes something true or false, but it determines what that person will consider true or false. But since this is all that one has to go on, this will have to do.

Now, within this sytem one may have certainty. This is the type of certainty that Descartes ought to have been pleased with. However, he did not even have this. What Descartes sought was a meta-criterial certainty. He sought to have a certainty that his criterion of truth was, in fact, true considered outside of that system constructed by his criterion of truth. Obviously this can't be done, because one must determine what is true or false by means of a criterion; one would then need a criterion for criterions. This would result in the unhappy conclusion that 1. your criterion wasn't your criterion after all, and 2. a vicious infinite regress.

So, Descartes' problem was not that he sought certainty or that he sought a deductive system, but rather he sought a meta-criterial certainty that cannot be had. If this is a little confusing, and I imagine that it is because it is a little compressed, I'll explain more. Just post me a comment.